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The large-scale unemployment caused by the Great Recession has necessitated un-
precedented increases in the duration of unemployment insurance (UI). While it is
clear that the weekly payments are benecial to recipients, workers receiving benets
have less incentive to engage in job search and accept job oers. We construct a job
search activity index based on Google data which provides the rst high-frequency,
state-specic measure of job search activity. We demonstrate the validity of our mea-
sure by benchmarking it against the American Time Use Survey and the comScore
Web-User Panel, and also by showing that it varies with hypothesized drivers of search
activity. We test for search activity responses to policy shifts and changes in the dis-
tribution of unemployment benet duration. We nd that search activity is greater
when a claimant's UI benets near exhaustion. Furthermore, search activity responses
to the passage of bills that increase unemployment benets duration are negative but
short-lived in most specications. Using daily data, we estimate that an increase by
1% of the population of unemployed receiving additional benets results in a decrease
in aggregate search activity of 1.7% lasting only one week.
This research was supported by the Shultz Graduate Student Fellowship in Economic Policy through a
grant to the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
11 Introduction
Online job search is an increasingly important component of overall job search activity in
the United States, with over 83% of job seekers using the Internet for job search in 2008.
Freely available data on online job search provides researchers with a high frequency measure
of aggregate job search activity. We demonstrate that uctuations in internet searches for
jobs over time and across states track closely to demonstrated drivers of search activity (eg.
unemployment rates, days of the week, and holidays) and other measures of job search. We
develop a job search index using publicly available Google Search data and estimate the
response of job search activities to changes in unemployment benet policy, utilizing the
high frequency variation in online search behavior around the time of the policy change.
The policy changes we consider are the recent (2008-2010) unemployment insurance (UI)
extensions and expansions on aggregate job search activity. On average, the extensions and
expansions of UI decreased job search by 1.7% for every percentage point of the unemployed
directly aected by the policy change, with the eect lasting only one week. We undertake a
quantitative exercise that suggests that UI policy changes did not aect the unemployment
rate signicantly during the recession.
Economic theory predicts that job search activity varies with the marginal return of
search, UI policies, and liquidity needs; job search activity is also important in determining
steady state unemployment levels. However, the models of job search activity are dicult to
estimate due to the diculty of measuring aggregate job search activity. Our new measure
of job search activity allows us to develop novel tests of job search theories. Furthermore,
the almost immediate availability of Google search data can allow researchers to examine
the eects of policies on behavior in real time. Our results demonstrate the utility of Google
job search as an instant feedback tool for policy makers.
Our proposed measure of job search activity has a number of advantages over previously
used measures of job search, such as those obtained from the American Time-Use Survey
(ATUS). Firstly, the ATUS's small sample size creates a situation in which state-month level
2data may contain fewer than 5 unemployed respondents, making them unsuitable for ne
state-level or time-series analysis. For example, most theories of job search predict that local
labor market conditions have a strong eect on the magnitude of the search activity response.
However, the small samples in the ATUS make it dicult to account for local labor market
conditions. Using online search data sidesteps the problem that many encounter when using
survey data, where inaccurate recall and the nature of surveyed responses can create biased
results.
Another advantage of our measure is that it is available immediately at a daily level.
We compile a daily state-level panel spanning 6 years to precisely measure the impact of
announcements regarding unemployment benets on the level of search activity, an exercise
unsuited for coarser monthly data. Using variation in state-level unemployment and UI
benet structure, we test for a dierential eort response based on diering labor market
conditions. Overall, we nd evidence for somewhat higher levels of search at the beginning
and end of a UI spell. As predicted by theory, changes in search activity are more responsive
to changes in policy and labor market conditions when search activity is at a relatively
lower level. We also nd evidence for declines in search activity following expansions of




Krueger and Mueller (2010), study how job search behavior of individuals varies across states
and at dierent points during an unemployment spell using American Time Use Survey data.
They nd elasticities of job search with respect to the level of unemployment benets on
the order of -1.6 to -2.2. They also nd increases in job search activities prior to benet
exhaustion, while those ineligible for unemployment benets see no such increase.
3In a dierent contribution, Krueger and Mueller (2011) administer a survey to UI recip-
ients in New Jersey which asks questions about job search activity and reservation wages.
Importantly, as a reference for our study, they nd that eort decreases over the duration of
unemployment and that reservation wages remain approximately constant throughout the
unemployment spell. They look at the correlation between job search activity and job nding
rate and nd that an extra 20 hours per week make an individual 20% more likely to exit.
However, their identication strategy for the eects of the 2009 expansion of Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) cannot separate time trends from the policy change.
They nd that after the policy change, there is on average 12 minutes less job search per
day.
Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) discuss the prevalence of online search as a component of job
search activity. They note that, as of 1998, approximately 15% of unemployed jobseekers
used the internet to search for jobs, exceeding the amount of job search done through pri-
vate employment agencies, contacting friends, or utilizing unions. Furthermore, they found
that over half of respondents who had internet access from home searched online for jobs.
Stevenson (2008) nds that, while a majority of online job searchers are currently employed,
over the past 10 years unemployed job searchers have come to use the internet much more
extensively. Furthermore, as the penetration of internet access increases, the unemployed
devote a greater fraction of their job search time to online search and the proportion of job
seekers directly contacting potential employers increases. In mid-2002, 22% of job seekers
found their jobs online, a number that has surely increased consistently through the decade.
We corroborate these results later in the paper using more recent National Longitutinal
Survey of Youth data.
Given the rapid increase in both access to the internet (as of 2010, approximately 80%
of Americans had internet access from home) and the increase in the number and size of
job search related sites, it is safe to assume that online job search currently represents an
important component of overall job search. Furthermore, we believe that online search
4behavior is an interesting behavior to explain, not only as a proxy for overall job search,
but also in and of itself. The increased availability of internet job search services and the
decreased use of physical classied jobs ads has made online job search more prevalent over
the past decade (Kroft and Pope (2010)). Therefore, online search is becoming a larger part
of the aggregate job search activity.
Holzer (1986) nds that job searchers are relatively ecient in the allocation of their
search eort, spending more time in job search activities which are more `productive' in
terms of nding a job. This nding highlights the importance of controlling for local labor
market conditions, as searchers respond to changing marginal returns to job search.
In addition, data from Google Insights for Search has been used in several other papers.
Choi and Varian (2009a and 2009b) and D'Amuri and Marcucci (2011) have demonstrated
the utility of Google search data in forecasting several categories of sales and initial un-
employment claims. Da, Gao and Engelberg (2011) use Google search data as a proxy for
investors' attention to stocks, showing that it predicts stock price movement.
2.2 Job Search Activity and Optimal Policy
An enhanced ability to measure job search activity also oers insight into the moral haz-
ard aspect of extending or increasing unemployment benets. Raj Chetty (2008) examines
the implications of increases in unemployment benets on duration of unemployment. He
separates the impact into a positive `liquidity' eect and a negative `moral hazard' eect.
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation, he nds that 60% of the increase in
unemployment duration resulting from an increase in UI benets can be attributed to the
`liquidity' eect. Thus, an observed increase in unemployment duration following an increase
in benets need not be a net welfare loss. If we observe large decreases in job search activity
following such an increase, we might surmise that eort is more responsive to unemployment
benets than is the reservation wage.
Mortensen (1977) is the canonical model of job search with expiring UI duration. He
5shows that, holding the match rate constant, job search activity increases as UI benets
come closer to expiring. Most studies of optimal UI policy focus on the level rather than
the duration of benets, despite the fact that, in practice, duration is the dimension of
UI most aected by policy. Kroft and Notowidigdo (2010) estimate that the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to the benet level is -1.10 when unemployment is low,
but is only -.32 when unemployment is high. They use the above dierence to calibrate the
optimal replacement rate in a Baily-Chetty sucient statistic framework. They show that
the optimal replacement rate should be higher when there is higher unemployment.
Similarly, Landais, Michaillat, Saez (2010) analyze optimal UI policy over the business
cycle. They develop a general equilibrium model where search activity imposes a negative
externality on other job searchers. Their model implies that job search activity has little
eect on aggregate unemployment in recessions due to job rationing. They demonstrate that
the welfare relevant elasticity in the sucient statistic framework is the macro elasticity of
unemployment with respect to benets. They show that in a calibrated DSGE model, UI
should be more generous in recessions.
It is worth stressing that none of the above papers derive optimal UI durations or estimate
empirical estimates of elasticities of unemployment duration with respect to UI duration.
Our paper contributes by providing a credible estimate of the elasticity of search eort with
respect to UI durations. Further, we quantify the eect the changes in search eort could
have on job nding probability.
3 Data
3.1 Google Search Data
Our measures of job search activity are constructed from indices of search activity obtained
from Google Insights for Search. Google Insights allows us to obtain a regional time series of
the relative amount of search activity for specic search terms on Google.com.1 The numerical
6values we obtain are normalized and scaled measures of this search activity. Specically, for
a given time period, the values represent the number of searches on Google.com for the
specied search term relative to the total number of searches on Google.com. Furthermore,
the values are normalized such that the highest value for the entire time period is set equal
to 100. Thus, the range of values is always between 0 and 100, where higher values represent
higher fractions of total searches on Google.com were for the indicated search term.2 An
example of the results from a Google Insights search can be seen in Figure 1.
We use Google Insights in two ways. Firstly, we use data at a state-month level. Monthly
search data allows for comparison to CPS and ATUS monthly data. Secondly, we take non-
overlapping three month samples of data at a state-day level (Google limits daily data
extraction to three month periods). We aggregate the three month periods into a panel of
daily data from 2005-2010. Each sample has a dierent scaling so our empirical specications
include only logged measures of our index, as well as appropriate sample xed eects, in order
to remove the scaling eect. Daily data allows us to measure the immediate eects of shocks
to the UI system caused by passage of new legislation or by meeting thresholds in existing
legislation. For both methods, we choose the search term `jobs' as our term of interest.
A natural concern with our Google measure of job search is the representativeness of
online job search in terms of overall job search activity. We obtain one measure of how
widespread online job search is using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
The NLSY includes a question that asks respondents about the usage of the internet for job
search from 2001 to 2008. In 2003, 53 percent of job seekers used the internet whereas 83
percent did in 2008. The most internet intensive activities are resume submissions, placing
ads, and contacting schools' career centers. Rates of internet usage in job search increased
with education but did not vary systematically by census region. Furthermore, there are
many job related queries that are encompassed in the `jobs' query. For example, people
may search for jobs at a specic company or region. For such queries, Google is one of
1http://www.google.com/insights/search
7the most eective ways of nding the appropriate job posting.3 Another concern may be
the applicability of the search term `jobs'. We performed extensive tests and found this
term to be highly correlated with a multitude of plausibly job search related terms, such as
`state jobs', `how to nd a job', or `tech jobs'. The query, `jobs', also has very high volume
compared to related terms and is thus less prone to measurement error.
3.2 CPS
We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to measure the number and characteristics
of the unemployed. The CPS is conducted monthly on a sample of approximately 60,000
households, creating a representative national sample of the civilian, non-institutional
population. Each month, the survey asks each member of each household aged 16 or
older various questions regarding their work and activities during the week containing the
12th day of the month. Each household is surveyed for four successive months, then not
interviewed for eight months, then returned to the sample for the four following months.
Individuals are classied as unemployed if they meet the following criteria:
1. Not employed during the reference week
2. Available for work during that time
3. Made specic eort to nd employment during the four-week period ending with that reference week.
We use state-month level CPS data from January 2005 to December 2010. Our sample
aggregates 10,744,854 individual observations over the 72 months in our sample. We extract
the number of unemployed respondents and the characteristics of the unemployed population
(age distribution, educational attainment, income). Utilizing CPS data regarding the length
of unemployment spells for unemployed respondents, as well as state and national level
data on weeks of eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benets, we calculate the weeks of
eligibility remaining for all unemployed individuals.
2For example, the query `Walmart Jobs' exhibits similar intra-year trends as our standard measure.
3See Table 11 in the Appendix for a partial list of alternate terms tested
8We also break our analysis into subsamples of unemployed individuals based on a proxy
for eligibility for UI benets. We utilize the CPS question on `Reason for Unemployment'
to determine this classication. The most common reason for ineligibility for UI benets
was based on your category of unemployment as opposed to reasons relating to earnings or
previous work duration. Those who quit their jobs voluntarily, or are new entrants into the
labor force, are generally not eligible for UI benets. Leveraging this fact to create a CPS
proxy for eligibility, an individual is considered `eligible' if his given reason for unemployment
was: `Job Loser', `Layo', or 'Temp Job Ended'. An individual is considered ineligible
for benets if his given reason for unemployment was: `Job Leaver', `Re-entrant', or `New
Entrant'.
4 Validity of Search Activity Measure
4.1 ATUS
We use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) to check the consistency of our measure of
search activity. The ATUS data is a survey, taken throughout the year, of approximately
13,000 people. Each year since 2003, the ATUS selects a sample of households from the
population of households which have completed their nal interview for the CPS. A single
person is randomly selected from each household and interviewed by telephone about his
activities during the previous day. Weekend days are oversampled by approximately a 2.5 to
1 margin such that 50% of the interviews are conducting in regards to a weekday and 50%
in regards to a weekend day. Households are called for up to 8 times in order to obtain an
interview with a member of the household, ensuring a relatively high response rate.
We use the ATUS data and Kreuger and Mueller's (2010) methodology in order to com-
pare our Google measure of job search activity to their ATUS measure. ATUS job search
activity is calculated using the amount of time that individuals spend in job search related
activities.4 Table 1 gives summary statistics regarding this dataset. Our individual job search
9value is the sum of all of the categories of job search for each respondent.
From these individual-level values, we take the state averages of job search time per capita
for each month. To compare it with our measure, we examine the correlation between the
monthly ATUS measure by state and our monthly state measure of job search activity. The
correlation is approximately .51, and is robust to inclusion or exclusion of job-related travel
time, removing the oversampling of weekend days, or using alternate Google search terms to
measure job search activity. Furthermore, as a placebo test, we nd insignicant correlation
to non-job search related terms such as `weather' or `sports'. The Google measure is slightly
more correlated with the ATUS job search indicator (the number of individuals engaged in
any amount of job search, per capita) than with the ATUS job search time variable. However,
the increased correlation may be due to the fact that the ATUS job search indicator has less
measurement error than the job search time variable.
Although the two data sets are clearly related, they do exhibit dierences. Dierences
between the two measures of job search can arise for two reasons. First, Google search and
the ATUS could be measuring dierent underlying behavior due to biases in survey answers
or due to the fundamental dierence between time spent on online job search and all job
search. Second, sampling creates variation in estimates and dierent subgroups are sampled
by the two measures.
4.2 ComScore
One possible issue with using Google search data as a proxy for job search eort is that the
ratio of Google search to time spent may not be constant across regions or demographics.
Furthermore, Google job search activity may be a dierent type of behavior from online job
search in general. We address these issues by using the comScore Web Behavior Database,
4We assembled all ATUS data from 2003-2009 (though Krueger and Meuller used only through 2007),
and restricted our comparison to people of ages 20-65. We examine comparisons including and excluding
`Travel Related to Work', which includes job search related travel but also many other types of job-related
travel. Krueger and Muller included this category in their analysis. ATUS categories encompassing job
search activities are: `Job Search Activities', `Job Interviewing', `Waiting Associated with Job Search or
Interview', `Security Procedures Related to Job Search/Interviewing', `Job Search and Interviewing, other'.
10a panel of 100,000 consenting internet users across the United States who were tracked
for the year 2007. ComScore tracks users at the domain level and includes household level
demographic variables, domain names, referral domain names, and the amount of time spent
on a website.5 We determine whether a person is searching for a job by summing the time
spent on websites that contain job relevant terms.6
Another worry about Google search is that the ratio of Google search activity to true
online job search activity is not constant across regions or time periods. Table 2 shows the
coecient of the regression of total time spent on online job search on amount of Google
searches for job related topics observed in comScore. Three regressions are run, the regres-
sion without controls, the regression with state xed eects and the regression with date
xed eects. In all three cases the estimated partial correlation between Google search and
total time spent searching is very close. The eect of each Google search for a job in the com-
Score data is approximately 7.5 minutes spent on job sites. Note, for the state xed eects
specication, the estimate is signicantly dierent from the other two estimates. However,
the estimated coecient only changes by 6 seconds, an economically insignicant amount.
4.3 Macroeconomic Drivers of Job Search
As our Google Job Search Index is not a direct measure of time spent on job search, we want
to make sure that it is a consistent proxy of true job search activity.
Table 3 displays results of regressions designed to provide information on the strength of
our measure of job search. We nd that our measure of job search is strongly correlated with
a variety of dierent macroeconomic variables which traditionally drive job search activity.
While these results are not causal, they all appear to move in the `expected' direction.
Column 1 reports the results of a regression of the change in our measure, month to
month, on the change in unemployment rate, as well as month and year xed eects. We
5ComScore tries to address issues of selection into this dataset, but we cannot assess how successfully.
6The domain names we search for are those containing `job',`career', `hiring' and `work' in addition to
the biggest job search sites: monster.com, careerbuilder.com, indeed.com, and linkedin.com. We remove any
websites containing `job' or other terms but are unrelated to job search.
11nd a strongly positive result, as an increased rate of unemployment should boost the number
of more active job seekers. The magnitude corresponds to an increase in online job search
activity of .7% when a state undergoes a 1% increase in unemployment rate. In Column
2, we add the number of initial unemployment benet claims per capita to our regression.
While this lowers the eect of a rise in unemployment rate, we still obtain positive eects
for both, as is expected, with a nearly 3% increase in predicted job search activity when the
number of initial claimants rises by 1 percentage point of the population.
In Column 3, we add the number of nal claims in the following month to our regression,
nding positive eects for all three variables. We expect that job search this month will be
positively correlated with the number of nal claims in the next month, as those who search
more in this month are more likely to be exiting unemployment benets in the following
month. We nd large eects for this variable, with an increase in job search of nearly 5%
correlated with a rise in next month's nal claimants of 1 percentage point of the population.
Column 4 adds the change in tightness (given by the number of vacancies divided by the
monthly unemployment rate), to the regression. As labor market tightness increases, we
would expect people to increase their job search activity as their marginal return to one
more minute of job search has increased (although there do exist models where the direction
of this comparative static is ambiguous). Indeed, we still nd positive eects of all variables.
4.4 Day of Week and Holiday Eects
Furthermore, it is to be expected that job search would follow strong day, month, and year
trends. We expect search to fall on weekends and holidays because of social commitments.
We expect search to increase around graduation time in the late spring and to increase over
the sample due to higher aggregate unemployment. We nd that overall search activity
increased dramatically during the recession as unemployment rose and more people start
searching for jobs. Job search as measured by our Google search index increases in January
after a holiday lull, and also increases at the end of the spring as expected.
12We examine the American Time Use Survey, comScore data, and our Google measure
in order to determine whether there are signicant `day of the week' eects and `holiday'
eects, as we would expect. Table 4 shows results from regressing indicators for holidays and
days of week on job search for each of these three measures. Columns 3 and 4 display results
from the American Time Use Survey. We nd large drops in search time on holidays, using
an indicator equal to one for any holiday as designated by the ATUS, and on weekends, with
search peaking during the beginning and middle of the week. Friday exhibits a lower level
of search than other weekdays, but higher than weekend days.7 The comScore measure
used is the total time spent on job search sites in a state on a particular day. Columns
5 and 6 display results from the comScore regression. Unlike the ATUS, the most time
spent on search is on Tuesdays, gradually dropping o towards the end of the week. There
is approximately 40 percent less time spent searching on holidays and 64 percent less on
weekends.
Columns 1 and 2 display the results for the Google search index. Google job search
shows a strikingly similar intraweek pattern of search behavior to comScore. Google job
search activity peaks on Tuesdays and gradually declines afterwards. The ratios of weekend
to holiday search are approximately the same for all 3 measures. Furthermore, the intraweek
pattern is very similar for Google job search and overall online job search time. We interpret
these results as evidence that Google search for 'jobs' is a good proxy for job search online.
However, we cannot say whether the diering intraweek pattern between our Google measure
and the ATUS measure is due to dierences in the type of job search done oine or due to
the sampling and design of the ATUS.
7ATUS holidays are New Year's Day, Easter, Memorial Day, the Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving
Day, and Christmas Day
135 Models of Eort Response to Policy
Consider a simple search activity model of a local labor market similar to Chetty (2009).
The utility of an unemployed person is given by:
uT(A0) = u(A0   A1 + bT)   f(e) +   ((e;)  [V (A1;w)] + (1   (e;))  UT 1(A1))
In the above equation, T denotes time until expiration of benets, A0 and A1 denote
assets in consecutive periods and bT are unemployment benets. The probability of nding
a job is determined by the choice of eort, e, and market tightness . The cost of eort,
f(e), is assumed to be strictly increasing and convex. Lastly, the continuation value is V (w)
for employment. For now, we assume that the wage is constant and that employment is an
absorbing state.
The endogenous variable that we seek to explain in the paper is eort, e. Below, we
consider some comparative statics for the response of eort with respect to variables of
interest. Consider a standard matching function where the match probability is independent
of the previous stock of vacancies:
(e;) = e    
1 
FOC : f
0(e) =   
0  (V (A;w)   UA;T 1)
The response of eort to changes in variables of interest is as follows. Consider an increase
in unemployment benets through an increase in the duration of benets. Ignoring general
equilibrium eects, an increase in unemployment benets increases the value of being of
unemployed in the next period. de
dVT 1 =      1 
f00(e) < 0. Therefore, an increase in
unemployment benets causes a decrease in eort. Note that, the decrease in eort is more
pronounced when tightness is higher. When the match probability is high, eort is more
responsive to changes in UI policy. Furthermore, the higher previous eort is, the less
14responsive current eort is to changes in the continuation value. Similarly, a decline in the
future assets of the household increases search activity by an amount proportional to the
match probability: de
dA1 =   0  (V 0(A;w)   U0
A;T 1=f00(e) < 0.
A crucial assumption in the above model is that the match rate is the same between newly
unemployed, prior unemployed, new vacancies and old vacancies. However, that may not be
the case, as Coles and Smith (1998) show in a model of job search without search frictions.
If the probability of match changes systematically over the duration of unemployment, the
dynamics of eort response could be nontrivial. If workers sample all vacancies in the rst
period, their future match rate is determined solely by the ow of new vacancies. Andrews,
Bradley, Stott and Upward (2007) use comprehensive data from a job matching market
to show that, indeed, the probability of match varies over the duration of unemployment.
They show that the stock of new vacancies increases the exit rate from unemployment for
job-seekers who are not recently unemployed. In our work, we look at the determinants
of search activity over the duration of unemployment but we cannot directly distinguish
between explanations of moral hazard versus explanations of lower exit rates caused by
longer duration.
The above discussion focuses on the decision of an individual. In reality, our search mea-
sure is an aggregate of the decisions of dierent state populations. Changes in state search
activity across states during the recession can be driven dierential responses by heteroge-
neous populations. The aggregate variables that we bring to the data are: unemployment
duration, unemployment, and market tightness. It is important to note that these variables
are, in general, endogenous and can also aect the decisions of employed job searchers. Our
measure of search activity is a weighted sum of the search activity of employed and unem-
ployed. Therefore, in the empirical portion of the paper, we look at policy changes which
directly aect only unemployed job seekers.
156 Empirical Strategy and Results
6.1 Unemployment Benet Extensions
We test for the eect of federal changes to unemployment benet policy on job search activity
using daily search data from Google Insights. In addition, we use responses to changes in
benet durations which occurred due to hitting threshold levels of state unemployment, as
governed by federal policy. There are four major modications to federal unemployment
insurance law in our empirical specications8
1. June 30th, 2008 - The Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program is created, giving
an additional 13 weeks of benets to the unemployed.
2. November 21st, 2008 - The EUC is expanded by 7 weeks for all unemployed and by 13 weeks for those
residing in states with greater than 6% unemployment.
3. November 6th, 2009 - The EUC is expanded by 13 weeks for unemployed residents of states with
greater than 6% unemployment and an additional 13 weeks for states with unemployment rates greater than
8.5%.
4. July 22nd, 2010 - The EUC program is extended by 6 months, preserving the extended benets for
many unemployed.
A sample trajectory of maximum weeks of UI for Oklahoma is displayed in Figure 3.
With indicators for the date of each policy change and the period following the policy
change, we are able to measure the impact of each extension or expansion. If there exists
considerable moral hazard in these programs, with those claiming unemployment not actively
seeking work, we would expect to see a fall in job search activity following the extension or
expansion of benets. However, there may be other trends operating on search activity. For
identication, we rely on the fact that the states with the most people impacted by the policy
8Also included as shocks are dates in which unemployment thresholds for the pre-existing federal Extended
Benets program are met in each state. Extended Benets are available to workers who have exhausted their
regular program and EUC08 unemployment insurance benets and during periods of high unemployment.
The basic Extended Benets program provides up to 13 additional weeks of benets when a State is expe-
riencing high unemployment (over 6%). Some States have also enacted a voluntary program to pay up to 7
additional weeks (20 weeks maximum) of Extended Benets during periods of extremely high unemployment
(over 8%).
16change should have the highest response in terms of change in job search activity. Note that,
for some states, the policy change occurred after the legislation is passed because the policy
is activated by a threshold unemployment rate. If the spike in exits from unemployment
benets in the last weeks of availability seen in Meyer (1990) is due to relatively high search
activity around the time of benet expiration, we would expect to nd a fall in search
activity.9 However, if the spike in exits is due primarily to a fall in the reservation wage, we
may observe little change in the amount of job search activity.
We measure the size of the aected population by using Department of Labor (DOL) data
on the amount of unemployed in each `Tier' of unemployment. Policy changes eectively
granted extra weeks of eligibility for states. After a policy change, there is usually an
observable spike in the unemployed population starting in a specic week. We use this
increase for the month following the change as a proxy for the aected population. This
is our best measurement of the population that was about to run out of benets (within a
month) but was able to receive them because of the policy change. Our measure is imperfect
for several reasons.
First, some people are eligible for fewer weeks than the maximum and we may not capture
these in our measurement. Second, we observe the data only at the monthly level, so we
do not know the number of unique individuals aected by the change. We approximate
this by dividing by the amount of weeks within the month that the policy was in eect.
Third, we do not know how much our measure is biased by people actually nding jobs
dierentially in dierent states. We expect that in states where the chance of nding a job is
highest, the eort response should be highest. This would bias our results towards 0. Last,
the data is imperfectly recorded. We observe clear inconsistencies in the reporting of some
states. Inconsistencies were conred through conversation with the DOL. We address data
recording issues by rerunning the regression on the subsample of states which, as the DOL
asserts, submitted correct data.
Our estimation strategy is a dierence in dierences. We look at dierences in the log
17of search activity before and after a policy changes and then across states where dierent
numbers of unemployed were aected. The estimating equation is:
JobSearchActivityst = 0 + PolicyChangeWeekXst +   Affecteds;Policy 
PolicyChangest + 1InitialUnemploymentClaimantsst +
2ContUnemploymentClaimantsst + feseason;s + weekt + dayofweekt + holidayt + ust
Here, JobSearchActivityst is the logged measure of job search activity (Daily). feseason;s
= 1 if an observation is from a given season and state. Fixed eects are also included
for each week in the sample, days of week, and holidays. `s' is a state and `t' is a
day. PolicyChangeWeekXst is an indicator for various periods (week 1, week 2 and/or
week 3) after the policy change day. Affecteds;Policy  PolicyChangest is an interaction
of PolicyChangest with our measure of the aected population for that state and policy
change. InitialUnemploymentClaimantsst and ContUnemploymentClaimantsst are mea-
sured at the weekly level by the DOL.
6.2 Eects of Legislation
In the Daily Panel all of the regressions are run in log levels. On the left hand side is a
daily measure of search activity. The regressions presented cover 2005-2010.10 Years with no
concurrent changes act as controls and allow us to estimate day of the week, holiday and
week xed eects. Further, xed eects for each state and season combination are included
to correct for the rescaling induced by the three-month sampling. With these season-state
indicators and a logged measure of search activity, the varying linear scaling factors are
simply removed as additive xed eects.
Our rst specication pools all of the national policy changes observed in our dataset.
The results in Table 5, Column 1, show that a one percentage point increase of the aected
population results in a 1.7% decrease in search activity. There is no statistically signicant
9Months aected by Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Mississippi were removed. Results are unaected
by the inclusion of these observations
18eect for subsequent weeks. Column 2 limits the subsample to those states for which the
DOL is more condent of the data. The point estimate increases to 3.3% for the rst week
and the subsequent weeks remain insigncant.
We then split up each policy change and look at them separately. Table 6 displays the
percent change in search eort for each policy change we observe. Although not all increases
in the maximum number of weeks are signicant, they are all the expected sign, negative.
The largest estimated eect corresponds to the EUC Expansion in November, 2009 (Column
3). Not surprisingly, the 2009 expansion adds the most weeks (26) of eligibility of any policy
in our sample.
6.3 Benet Exhaustion and Eligibility
Two factors aecting the level of job search are eligibility for UI and time until benets
exhaustion. We use the CPS to classify unemployed individuals as eligible or ineligible for
UI benets and determine the weeks of benets remaining. We then use these data to
examine how time until exhaustion of benets aects the amount of aggregate job search in
a state, and if this varies if we restrict our sample to those whom we think are eligible for
UI benets.
We utilize shifts in the composition of the unemployed, with respect to time until benet
exhaustion, in order to identify changes in job search activity. With this measure, we hope
to observe how job search activity changes as a claimant draws nearer to the exhaustion
of his benets. We measure the composition of the unemployed through unemployment
duration bins. Our vector of independent variables consists of a set of bins of the number of
residents per capita who have a certain range of weeks remaining in benets. For example,
one observation may be that in July of 2008 in Arizona, .6% of the population has between
0 and 10 weeks of unemployment benets remaining, .4% had between 11 and 20 weeks of
benets remaining, and so on.
This particular compositional measure is plausibly exogenous across states on a month
19to month basis, controlling for time trends and relevant macroeconomic characteristics. In
addition, much of the variation in this measure is derived from UI policy changes, which
drastically alter the composition of the unemployed in terms of weeks of benets remaining.
With this measure, we are able to assess how job search activity varies as a claimant moves
from being newly unemployed to being near the exhaustion of benets.
Our monthly specication examines shifts in the composition of the unemployed in terms
of weeks of benets remaining:
JobSearchActivitystm =
0+1WeeksLeft10stm+2WeeksLeft20stm+:::+ymY ear Monthym+sStates+usym
In this specication, JobSearchActivitystm is the change in logged measure of job
search activity. We also include Year-Month and state xed eects, Y ear   Monthym and
States, respectively. Our set of independent variables, such as WeeksLeftXX, represent
the number of unemployed per capita with less than XX weeks of benets remaining.
We also break our analysis into subsamples of unemployed individuals based on a proxy
for eligibility for UI benets, as was previously described. We then conduct our analysis
using only each of these subsamples; that is, setting WeeksLeft10 equal to only the number
of eligible (ineligible) unemployed per capita with less than 10 weeks of benets remaining
(or those who would have had less than 10 weeks of benets had they been eligible).
6.4 Eects of Benet Exhaustion and Eligibility
Table 7 displays results from our analysis of how time to benet exhaustion and eligibility
for UI benets aect job search. Column 1 reports results looking at the duration structure
of unemployment for the total population of unemployed. We nd generally insignicant
results and no strong pattern. Columns 2 and 3 present results from splitting our sample
into those who we assert are `eligible' or `ineligible' for UI benets.
For those who are eligible for unemployment benets, we nd little eect of the duration
20structure on unemployment, except when individuals reach their nal 10 weeks of unemploy-
ment. During these nal 10 weeks, we see an increase in search of 1.5% for every 1% of the
population in this category. Among the ineligible, we nd no such pattern, and a number
of week bins where we nd that more ineligible unemployed produces lower aggregate job
search activity. This nding is due to the fact that eligible unemployed are a distinct group
from ineligible unemployed and they search at a higher rate. As we control for changes in
overall unemployment levels, an increase in the amount of ineligible unemployed with no
change in the overall level of unemployment is equivalent to a decrease in the number of
eligible unemployed, and a corresponding drop in the overall level of job search.
7 Quantitative Signicance
We have estimated the eect of expansions and extension of UI benets on job search activity.
In order to evaluate eects on policy-relevant outcomes, we need to convert the resulting
change in job search activity into a job nding probability; that is, nd the elasticity of
job nding with respect to job search. The ideal exercise would examine a national panel
of individual level data on job search as well as job nding in order to quantify eects of
increased search eort across dierent local labor markets. In the absence of this matched
individual level panel, we combine our estaimtes of search eort response to policy with
Krueger and Mueller's (2011) estimate for the elasticity of UI exit to job search time in
order to provide an estimate of the eects of UI extensions on job nding.
Estimating a regression at the month-state level with the total minutes spent on job
search in the ATUS as the dependent variable (controlling for the unemployment rate, state,
year and month xed eects), we nd that a 1% increase in job search increases time spent
on job search in a week by 2.7 minutes per day (Table 8, Column 1). Suppose that there are
100 people in the population and that 10% are unemployed. In the ATUS, each unemployed
person searches an average of 29 minutes per day, while each employed person searches about
21.7 minutes. Therefore, there are 313 minutes of total job search in our economy. An expansion
of UI benets aecting 1% of the population (1 person) leads to a 1.7% decrease in aggregate
job search (Table 5, Column 1), corresponding to a 14.4 minute per day decrease in aggregate
search. Assuming the eect is concentrated solely on the aected person, this represents a
50% decrease in job search for the aected person. Krueger and Mueller (2011) estimate
that the eect of an extra 20 hours a week of search is a 3.5% increase in exit probability.
Using this estimate and our estimated search decrease of 100.8 minutes per week, we nd a
decrease in exit probability by .3%. Given that each policy on average aects .33% of the
population, on average, 3,070 people do not nd jobs because of a policy change we observe.
If we use the maximum eect we nd, for the November 2009 legislation, the number of
searchers that do not nd jobs increases by a factor of 10, to 30,700 people. The estimates
are economically small and suggest that the immediate eects of UI expansions do not have
an economically signicant impact on the aggregate unemployment rate.
Now consider a similar exercise but using an alternate conversion of Google search to time
spent on online job search using the comScore panel. Controlling for the unemployment rate,
season-state, day of week and week xed eects we nd that a 1% increase in job search
increases time spent on job search in a day by .35% per day (Table 8, Column 2). Suppose
that there are 100 people in the population and that 10% are unemployed. In comScore,
each active searcher searches an average of 28 minutes per day and each inactive searcher
searches .02 minutes per day. Thus, there are 282 total minutes of online job search in
the economy. An expansion of UI benets aecting 1% of the population leads to a 1.7%
decrease in job search, corresponding to a 1.6 minute decrease in aggregate search activity
per day. Assuming the eect is concentrated solely on the aected person, this represents a
6.2% decrease in job search for the aected person. Following the same procedure as with
the ATUS data, we nd that, on average, 334 people do not nd jobs because of a policy
change we observe. If we use the maximum eect we nd, for the November 2009 legislation,
the number that do not nd jobs increases to approximately 3340 people. The comScore
22estimates are an order of magnitude smaller than those using the ATUS calibration.
We explain the discrepancy by noting that the comScore regression includes controls
that mirror the specication for estimating the causal eect of a policy change. On the other
hand, the ATUS partial correlation with the Google search measure was estimated using
a monthly estimation because of the lack of more detailed ATUS data. Further, the eect
in the ATUS could be bigger the ATUs captures more types of job search (i.e. interviews
and phone calls). Lastly, job searchers in comScore may be selected non-randomly into the
sample. In any case, both sets of estimates support that the UI benet extensions enacted
from 2008-2010 did not have an economically signicant eect on unemployment rates.
8 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the validity of a novel measure of aggregate job search activity in
the economy. Using data from Google Insights, we have constructed a daily index at a state
level which we utilize to examine moral hazard due to UI and labor market conditions. We
believe that this measure can be usefully applied in directly testing theories regarding job
search behavior. One potential application is in macro models of the labor market, where
aggregate job search activity is usually inferred from a calibrated elasticity.
Using the panel variation in the unemployment duration of UI claimants, we demonstrate
that search activity is higher for those at the onset an unemployment spell and and those
when nearing exhaustion of their benets. We also nd that job search responses to the
passage of bills that increase unemployment benets duration are negative but small in most
specications. Using daily data, we estimate that on average an increase by 1% of the
population of unemployed directly aected by an increase in maximum weeks of UI results
in a 1.7-3.2% decrease in job search activity for 1 week. When the eort response is broken
out across each policy, we nd that the Nov 2009 expansion of UI for up to an additional
26 weeks in some states had the greatest impact. Although less precisely estimated, an
23increase in 1% of the population aected by the policy change, results in a 17% decrease in
search. Both of the estimated eects lasted for only a week. Our estimates suggest that the
immediate impact of policy changes on eort is small.
Our quantitative exercise suggests an economically small eect of 1100 people not nding
a job in a week after the policy change. A challenge in the future is to more credibly relate
percentage changes in online search activity to real world changes in actual job nding and
into time spent searching as measured in minutes. We note that there are several other
elasticities of job search with respect to UI which we have not estimated. Other elasticities
relate to the dynamic responses of job searchers over their duration of unemployment to
increases in maximum weeks. Furthermore, we do not know the extent to which expectations
about policy changes shaped pre-policy change search levels.
Our results are applicable to debates regarding the optimal structure of UI. A key input
into the Baily-Chetty framework is the elasticity of search activity with respect to benets
which we have estimated in this paper. Furthermore, the modest magnitudes and short
duration of the search responses suggest that extensions of UI are not a primary driver of
persistent unemployment in the Great Recession.
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26Figure 1: Example of Google Insights Search
Figure 2: Continued Unemployment Claims





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data on percentage of the population in various tiers or bins of unemployment benets is
taken from monthly CPS data. Self-reported unemployed respondents are tallied and the
duration of their unemployment is noted. Total weeks of benets available are derived from
state unemployment benets laws combined with federal unemployment benet laws. Weeks
of benet availability are added when a respondent's state crosses the unemployment rate
threshold for additional federal benets, when they become available in 2008 and 2009. Also
noted is the presence of a week waiting period for any given state, which delays the onset of
benets by 1 week relative to the onset of unemployment. With respondents' unemployment
duration and the total weeks of availability, we construct a measure of the percentage of a
state's population which falls into any of a number of bins of weeks left. For example, a
resident who has been unemployed for 21 weeks in a state with a waiting period and which
oers 26 weeks of benets would have 26 21+1 = 6 weeks of benets remaining, and would
fall into the `0-10 Weeks Left' bin as well as the `6-10 Weeks Left' bin. If, in the next week,
Congress passed a bill extending benets by 7 weeks, he would now have 26 22+1+7 = 12
weeks of benets remaining and would then fall into the corresponding bins. Controlling
for the overall rate of unemployment, these bins measure shifts in the distribution of the
unemployed in terms of nearness to benet exhaustion.
The variables regarding initial and continued unemployment claims are taken from the
US Department of Labor, which publishes weekly reports on these numbers for all states.
Initial claims numbers represent the number of unemployment benet claimants, per capita,
by state, who are on their rst week of benets. The continued claims numbers represent the
number of unemployment benet claimants, per capita, by state, who are receiving benets
but not for the rst week. For the monthly panel, a monthly average for each set of weekly
data is utilized.
37Table 9: State Unemployment Benets - 2004
State Wait Period? Min Benet Max Benet Min Duration Max Duration
Alabama No 45 210 15 26
Arizona Yes 40 205 12 26
Arkansas Yes 63 345 9 26
California Yes 40 410 14 26
Colorado Yes 25 398 13 26
Connecticut No 15 429 26 26
Delaware No 20 330 24 26
D.C. Yes 50 309 19 26
Florida Yes 32 275 9 26
Georgia No 40 300 9 26
Hawaii Yes 5 417 26 26
Illinois Yes 51 326 26 26
Indiana Yes 50 348 8 26
Kansas Yes 87 351 10 26
Kentucky No 39 365 15 26
Louisiana Yes 10 258 21 26
Maryland No 25 310 26 26
Massachusetts Yes 29 508 10 30
Michigan No 81 362 14 26
Minnesota Yes 38 478 10 26
Mississippi Yes 30 210 13 26
Missouri Yes 40 250 13 26
Nebraska Yes 36 280 15 26
Nevada No 16 317 12 26
New Hampshire No 32 372 26 26
New Jersey Yes 61 490 15 26
New Mexico Yes 58 290 19 26
New York Yes 40 405 26 26
North Carolina Yes 36 416 13 26
Ohio Yes 90 323 20 26
Oklahoma Yes 16 275 22 26
Oregon Yes 96 410 3 26
Pennsylvania Yes 35 461 16 26
Rhode Island Yes 56 441 8 26
South Carolina Yes 20 278 15 26
Tennessee Yes 30 275 13 26
Texas Yes 53 328 9 26
Utah Yes 24 377 10 26
Virginia Yes 50 316 12 26
Washington Yes 109 496 12 30
West Virginia Yes 24 358 26 26
Wisconsin No 49 329 12 26
Wait Period refers to the existence of a one week waiting period at the start of an unemployment spell during which a claimant cannot yet receive
benets. Min Benets and Min Durations refer to minimum levels and lengths of benets given that one meets the minimum requirements to
be eligible for any unemployment benets.
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